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Abstract  
This paper invest igates whether daddy quotas -  non- t ransferable paternity 
leave policies -  m it igate motherhood penalt ies women face in the labor 
market . Using the int roduct ion of a daddy quota in Quebec, Canada as a 
natural experiment , the authors employ labor force survey data to conduct  
a difference- in-difference est imat ion of the policy’s im pact  on a range of 
mothers’ career outcomes. The results suggest  Quebec mothers exposed 
to the policy are 5 percentage points m ore likely to part icipate in the labor 
force and to work full- t ime, 5 percentage points less likely to work part -
t ime, and 4 percentage points less likely to be unemployed. These results 
are robust  to an alternat ive sem iparametr ic difference- in-difference 
methodology and to a bat tery of placebo and sensit ivity tests. However, 
the authors find that  the policy’s effects are largest  two to three years post -
reform , reducing in size and signif icance thereafter, raising quest ions about  
the durability of such effects. 
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1 . I nt roduct ion 
The literature on gender gaps in women’s labor market  outcomes broadly 
acknowledges ‘motherhood penalt ies’ at  work in depressing women’s labor 
market  at tachment , wages and occupat ional mobility  relat ive to men’s 
outcomes. Such penalt ies are dr iven, at  least  in part , by unequal divisions 
of unpaid care work between men and women and by women’s career 
interrupt ions around the bir th of children (Bianchi,  2011;  Bianchi et  al.,  
2012, Budig et  al. ,  2012;  Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003;  Sigle-Rushton & 
Waldfogel,  2007) . Across OECD count r ies, mothers spend more t ime on 
childcare and household work and are more likely to take t ime out  of the 
workforce and to work reduced hours to care for children than their  male 
counterparts (OECD, 2012) . These career interrupt ions often have long-
term  implicat ions for other career outcomes for mothers, such as earnings, 
with good evidence that  these penalt ies persist  across count r ies and 
welfare regimes, although to varying degrees of severity (e.g.  Budig, 
Misra, & Boeckmann, 2012;  Harkness & Waldfogel, 2003;  Sigle-Rushton & 
Waldfogel, 2007) . 
 
Daddy quotas – or non- t ransferrable per iods of leave reserved for fathers 
– may alleviate these motherhood penalt ies by encouraging more gender-
equal divisions of childcare dut ies within the household, by allowing 
mothers to dedicate more t ime to paid work – thereby potent ially improving 
their  posit ions in the labor market  – and by eroding possible employer 
biases. However, research on the effect  of daddy quotas on mothers’ labor 
market  outcomes thus far is inconclusive.  The causal studies published to 
date focus predom inant ly on experiences in Scandinavian count r ies and 
produce conflict ing results. For instance some studies have found that  
daddy quota policies improve mothers’ labor market  outcomes (Andersen, 
2018 for Denmakr;  E.-A. Johansson, 2010 for Sweden;  Patnaik, 
forthcom ing for Quebec.)  while others have found no effect  (Ekberg, 
Er iksson, & Fr iebel, 2013 for Sweden)  and st ill others have est imated 
negat ive effects on mothers’ labor market  outcomes (Cools, Fiva, & 
Kirkeboen, 2015 for Norway) . 
 
Despite the lack of consistent  evidence on the impact  of these policies, non-
t ransferrable paternity leave cont inues to appear on the policy agendas of 
governments and polit ical part ies from South Korea to Spain and to the 
United Kingdom  (Kim , 2017;  Meil, Lapuerta and Escobedo, 2017;  House of 
Commons, 2018) . As count r ies cont inue to adopt  or consider adopt ing 
daddy quota policies as a means of addressing gender inequalit ies at  work 
and at  home, further evidence is needed to understand their  effects in a 
var iety of welfare state contexts. 
 
This paper cont r ibutes to this effort  by analyzing the impact  of the 
implementat ion of a 2006 daddy quota policy in Quebec, Canada on 
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mothers’ labor market  outcomes. Employing a difference- in-difference 
technique, we exam ine the impact  of the policy on women’s labor force 
part icipat ion, full- t ime and part - t ime employment , unem ployment , and 
hourly wages, analyzing both average effects in the five years post  
implementat ion and how these effects develop across post - reform  years. 
We find that  exposure to the policy substant ially increases mothers’ 
likelihood of part icipat ing in the labor force and working full- t ime, and 
decreases their  likelihood of working part - t ime and being unemployed. We 
find no stat ist ically significant  effect  on hourly wages. Furthermore, we find 
that  the effects of the policy are largest  in 2008 and 2009, two to three 
years post - reform , raising quest ion over whether the policy had last ing 
effects. Our findings are robust  to an alternat ive sem i-parametr ic 
difference- in-difference methodology and a bat tery of placebo and 
sensit ivit y tests. 
 
We make several cont r ibut ions to the ongoing debate over the effects of 
daddy quota policies on mothers’ employment  outcomes. First , our study 
is among the first  explor ing the impact  daddy quota policies on mothers 
labor market  outcomes in a context  outside of the generous social welfare 
benefits, high levels of decommodificat ion and egalitar ianism  that  
character ize Nordic welfare states. Second, we im prove upon the only 
exist ing causal study on Quebec’s daddy quota by employing a design that  
exploits eight  years of labor force survey data, allowing us to establish with 
greater confidence that  the ident ifying assumpt ions of our analysis hold 
t rue. Third, we explore the impact  of Quebec’s daddy quota on a broad 
range of labor market  outcomes, including those that  capture outcomes on 
the intensive margin ( full- t ime, part - t ime and hourly wages)  and the 
extensive margin ( labor force part icipat ion and unem ployment) .  Finally, we 
explore the development  and durability  of daddy quota policies, analysing 
how the policy’s effects on a year-by-year basis f ive years post - reform . We 
discuss these in greater detail in sect ion 2.4. 
 
2 . Literature Review  and Background 
2 .1 . The I nt roduct ion of QPI P 
 
I mplemented on January 1, 2006, the Regime Quebecois D’assurance 
Parentale or the Quebec Parental I nsurance Plan (QPI P)  m ade substant ial 
changes to the parental leave scheme in Quebec. The policy replaced the 
nat ional parental leave scheme provided by the Em ployment  I nsurance (EI )  
program, which ent it led parents to one-year job-protected leave after the 
bir th of a child. QPI P’s provisions, detailed in Table 2.1, were designed to 
improve upon the nat ional EI  program by reducing barr iers to parents’ use 
of parental leave provisions by increasing flexibility , eligibility and econom ic 
feasibilit y of taking leave as well as addressing gendered at t itudes toward 
parental leave (Patnaik, forthcom ing) .  
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QPI P int roduced a daddy quota, where five weeks of leave (or three weeks 
with higher wage replacement)  are reserved exclusively for fathers and 
cannot  be t ransferred to mothers. While fathers had access to parental 
leave through the shared leave offered under EI , they had no indiv idual 
r ight  to paternity leave. QPI P had a substant ial impact  on fathers’ use of 
paternity leave in Quebec:  Patnaik ( forthcom ing)  est imated that  exposure 
to the policy increased take up by 53 percentage points and increased leave 
durat ion by 3 weeks on average. 
 
Table 2 .1 . Com parison of QPI P and EI  Benefit  Details 
(Service Canada, 2016)  Note:  maximum  insurable earnings caps reflect  2006 
figures. 
 
2 .2 . Dr ivers of Motherhood Penalt ies in the Labor Market  
 
Empir ical work has consistent ly found that  mothers’ wages, labor force 
at tachment  and occupat ional mobilit y  suffer compared to those of non-
mothers and men across OECD count r ies and over t ime (OECD, 2012;  
Sigle-Rushton & Waldfogel,  2007) . One theory explaining the persistence 
of motherhood penalt ies, by Becker (1985) , contends that  mothers’ 
lowered labor market  outcomes are the result  of gender- role specializat ion 
at  the household level. Because women spend t ime and effort  on care work 
– and because both are finite resources – women econom ize on their 
part icipat ion in paid work, which has negat ive implicat ions for their  
earnings and occupat ional mobility (Becker, 1985) . 
 
 EI  QPI P 
Choice of durat ion None Basic plan (BP)  or special plan 
(SP)  
Maternity leave Durat ion 15 weeks 18 (BP)  or 15 weeks (SP)  
Benefit  55%  70 (BP)  or 75%  (SP)  
Paternit y leave Durat ion  None 5 (BP)  or 3 weeks (SP)  
Benefit  None 70 (BP)  or 75%  (SP)  
Parental leave Durat ion  35 weeks  32 (BP)  or 25 weeks (SP)  
Benefit  55%  7 weeks at  70%  and 25 weeks at  
55%  (BP)  or 25 weeks at  75%  
(SP)  
Coverage Employed 
workers 
Employed and self-employed 
workers 
Eligibilit y requirements 600 hr insurable 
earnings 
I nsurable income of $2000 
Maximum annual insurable 
earnings 
$39,000 $57,000 
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2 .3 . Addressing Motherhood Penalt ies by Reducing Sex-
Specializat ion 
 
Research suggests that  paternity leave may reduce sex-specializat ion 
within the household through a var iety of mechanisms. Fathers who take 
paternity leave increase their  skill levels as caregivers and become bet ter 
equipped and therefore more likely to provide care later on in children’s 
lives (Hook, 2010;  Lammi-Taskula, 2006) . Fathers’ take up of paternity 
leave may also establish more gender egalitar ian div isions of household 
labor within couples that  endure beyond the per iod of leave taken 
(Bjornberg, 2002;  Hook, 2006, 2010) . I ndeed, a num ber of studies have 
found that  fathers who part icipate in paternity leave are more likely to be 
involved in childcare responsibilit ies in subsequent  years compared to 
fathers who do not  take leave (Haas & Hwang, 2008;  Nepomnyaschy & 
Waldfogel, 2007;  Tanaka & Waldfogel, 2007) .  
 
The reduct ion of sex specializat ion within the household m ay help to erode 
motherhood penalt ies in the labor market  by allowing mothers to dedicate 
more t ime and energy to paid work, reducing any real or perceived 
product iv ity losses employers associate with motherhood (e.g. Correl, 
Benard, & Paik, 2007) . However, fathers face a number of disincent ives to 
taking parental leave in count r ies with gender-neut ral leave policies (e.g. 
Fox, Pascall,  & Warren, 2009;  Haas & Rostgaard, 2011;  OECD, 2012) . 
Because leave benefits are often calculated as percentages of the leave-
taker’s wages and are capped at  a modest  level, it  often makes more sense 
econom ically for the lower-earning parent  (often the mother)  to take leave 
(Zhelyazkova, 2013) . Em ployers’ gendered at t itudes can also disincent iv ize 
men from taking parental leave available to them (Bygren & Duvander, 
2006) . Daddy quotas address such obstacles by providing econom ic 
incent ives to take leave and normalizing paternity leave (Haas & Rostgaard, 
2011) .  
 
2 .4 . Previous Research on the I m pact  of Daddy Quotas 
 
While previous research has ident ified an associat ion between daddy 
quotas and more gender egalitar ian divisions of labor (e.g. Brandth & 
Kvande, 1998;  Hook, 2010;  Sullivan et  al., 2009) , causal studies analyzing 
the effects of such policies are few, find m ixed results and focus 
predom inant ly on Scandinavian count r ies. Analyzing the 1993 
implementat ion of a 4-week daddy quota in Norway, Kotsadam and 
Finseraas (2011)  found that  parents exposed to the policy were 50%  more 
likely to report  sharing the task of washing clothes equally between 
partners 15 years post  reform , suggest ing the policy was successful in 
encouraging de-specializat ion. However, Cools et  al. (2015) , studying the 
same reform , found no evidence that  the policy benefited mothers’ labor 
market  outcomes two to five years post  reform . I n fact , their  analysis of 
the policy’s effects on mothers whose partner took the leave found it  
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decreased mothers’ annual earnings by 3.5% , with negligible and 
stat ist ically insignif icant  effects on em ployment  rates, and full- t ime and 
part - t ime employm ent .  
 
Analysing the 1995 int roduct ion of a one-month daddy quota in Sweden, 
Ekberg et  al.  (2013)  found no evidence that  the policy decreased 
specializat ion within the household, finding no signif icant  effect  on fathers’ 
likelihood of car ing for a sick child eight  years post  reform  and no effects 
on labor market  outcomes for mothers 13 years post  reform . I n cont rast , 
Johansson (2010) , exam ining the sam e reform  and the extension of the 
Swedish daddy quota to two months in 2002, found an increase in mothers’ 
annual earnings of 6.7%  for each month of leave taken by fathers, although 
this est imat ion was only significant  at  the 10%  level.  
 
Studying the Danish context ,  Andersen (2018)  uses register data to analyze 
the im pact  of f ive parental leave systems on within couple gender wage 
gaps. She finds that  increases in fathers’ household share of leave reduces 
gender wage gaps by increasing mothers’ wages.   
A few causal studies have focused on the impact  of var ious types of 
paternity leave policies apart  from  daddy quotas on mothers’ labor market  
outcomes. For exam ple several papers have studied the effects of the 2007 
int roduct ion of the Elterngeld policy in Germany, which const ituted a major  
overhaul of parental leave provision and financing and int roduced a bonus 
period of leave granted to parents where both parents share a port ion of 
the leave. These papers found that  the policy led to an increase in fathers’ 
take up of parental leave (Geisler & Kreyenfeld, 2012) , that  fathers who 
took paternity leave subsequent ly increased their  t ime spent  on childcare 
and decreased their  t ime spent  on market  work (Bünning, 2015)  and that  
the policy increased mothers’ employment  rates (although gains were 
largely concent rated in part - t ime work) , job cont inuity and job quality 
(Kluve & Schm itz, 2014) . A recent  paper analyzing the effects of a 2007 
int roduct ion of a two-week paternity leave policy in Spain on fert ility v ia 
the policies impacts on the costs associated with childbear ing found the 
policy increased m others’ labor force at tachment  and led to delays in 
subsequent  childbearing (Farré & González, 2019) . 
 
I n a forthcom ing paper, Patnaik ( forthcom ing)  used cross-sect ional t ime-
use data from the General Social Survey to invest igate the impact  of the 
Quebecois daddy quota (QPI P)  on sex-specializat ion, finding that  the policy 
increased fathers’ t ime spent  in unpaid domest ic work by over half an hour 
per day and increased mothers’ t ime spent  in paid work by an hour per day 
four years post  reform . She also found indicat ive evidence that  the policy 
increased employment  and full- t im e employment  by 5% . Patnaik’s 
est imated effects on employment  and full- t ime employment  are sim ilar in 
magnitude to our est imates, although these were only significant  at  the 
10%  level. This lack of precision may be due to her lim ited sample size:  
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the total num ber of observat ions in the t reatment  group in her analysis is 
around 200 individuals across pre-  and post -per iods.  
 
Although Patnaik’s results are prom ising evidence of the effects of QPI P on 
de-specializat ion, a key drawback of her study design is that  she only uses 
one pre- reform  and one post - reform  observat ion due to data availabilit y, 
which is problemat ic for several reasons. First , this design does not  allow 
for sufficient  reassurance that  the parallel t rends assum pt ion underpinning 
her difference- in-difference design is met . Second, it  does not  allow for 
placebo tests around the t reatment  year to ensure est imates ident ify 
effects of the policy rather than larger, macro t rends. Third, less cr it ically, 
this design also does not  allow for the explorat ion of how the effects of the 
policy evolve over t ime.   
 
Another drawback of Patnaik’s reliance on t ime-use data is that  although 
such data is useful for understanding relat ive t ime-use among mem bers of 
a household, it  may provide less reliable measurements of employment  
act iv it ies and pat terns throughout  the year. Because t ime diar ies record 
how individuals spend their  t ime on a given day or set  of days, they unable 
to capture var iat ions in working pat terns throughout  the year, such as 
seasonal employment , which may bias the results of Patnaik’s analysis. 
 
This paper improves upon the previous research on the implementat ion of 
Quebec’s daddy quota, employing a difference- in-difference design that  
uses three years of pre- reform  and five years of post - reform  data, and 
using a labor force survey designed to capture employment  pat terns. I n 
doing so, we cont r ibute to the small but  growing causal literature on daddy 
quotas, increasing the evidence base with which to assess the efficacy of 
such policies in dim inishing the motherhood penalt ies in the labor market . 
We explore a broad range of labor market  outcomes, including those that  
capture effects on the extensive margin such as labor force part icipat ion 
and unem ployment , as well as those on the intensive margin, like full- t ime 
and part - t ime em ployment  and hourly wages. Finally, unlike previous 
studies, we also explore how the effects of the policy develop across five 
years post  reform  to bet ter understand when effects em erge, how they 
change over t ime and whether they endure.  
 
3 . Data and Methods 
We use a difference- in-difference technique to est imate QPI P’s im pact  on 
mothers in Quebec with respect  to five labor market  outcomes, comparing 
differences in outcomes for Quebec mothers before the reform  (2003-2005) 
and after the reform  (2007-2011) , with the same difference in outcomes 
for mothers in the neighboring province of Ontar io.  
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3 .1 . Data 
 
We conduct  our analysis using annual cross-sect ional public use m icrodata 
from Stat ist ics Canada’s Survey of Labour I ncome Dynamics (SLI D)  for 
reference years 2003 – 2011, om it t ing data from the t reatm ent  year (2006) 
as we are unlikely to observe effects of QPI P in such an ear ly phase of 
implementat ion. SLI D is an annual household survey of approxim ately 
34,000 households (over eight  waves)  represent ing the populat ions of 
Canada’s 10 provinces. The data contains r ich informat ion on respondents’ 
labor market  act ivit ies, as well as informat ion on fam ily character ist ics. 
While SLI D has a rotat ing panel design, due to concerns over sample size 
we use it  cross-sect ionally.  
 
3 .2 . I dent ifying Treatm ent  and Control Groups 
 
Using informat ion on the age of the youngest  person in the respondents’ 
census fam ily (defined as a nuclear fam ily) , we ident ify Quebec mothers of 
young children as our t reatment  group. This group includes Quebec 
mothers with children under the age of 6 in the pre-period, and those whose 
youngest  child was born after QPI P’s im plementat ion (January 1, 2006)  in 
the post  per iod. For example, in reference year 2007, our t reatment  group 
is defined as Quebec mothers whose youngest  child is 1-year–old or 
younger while in 2008, our t reatment  group includes Quebec mothers 
whose youngest  child is 2-years-old or younger.  
 
We rest r ict  our t reatment  group to m arr ied and cohabitat ing mothers of 
small children in Quebec. These women, we argue, are most  likely to 
experience potent ial benefits to their  careers by increased father 
involvement  in child rear ing act iv it ies, although we are unable to determ ine 
from the data whether their  par tners actually took up the leave available 
to them. We exclude mothers under the age of 18, as these mothers are 
likely to be in full- t ime secondary educat ion. We also exclude women where 
the age difference between women and the youngest  child in the census 
fam ily is greater than 50;  as SLI D does not  specify the precise relat ionship 
between the youngest  person in the census fam ily and the respondent , we 
expect  such cases to be guardianship or grandparent  relat ionships.  
 
A number of possible cont rol groups were considered for this analysis, 
including mothers of young children from the neighboring province of 
Ontar io, mothers of young children from  Brit ish Colum bia and non-mothers 
from Quebec. Analysis of province- level character ist ics and of labor market  
t rends pr ior to QPI P’s implementat ion revealed mothers of young children 
from Ontar io to be the best  fit  (see sect ion 3.4 for a discussion of parallel 
t rends) .  
 
Quebec and Ontar io are the two most  populous provinces in Canada and 
const itute the count ry’s two largest  regional econom ies. The provinces are 
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comparable on a number of indicators of interest  pr ior to 2006, such as 
women’s labor force part icipat ion rate and unemployment  rate (Stat ist ics 
Canada, 2017) . Pr ior to QPI P’s 2006 implementat ion, they also offered 
parents the same parental leave scheme ( the Em ployment  I nsurance 
program) , which cont inued in Ontar io after 2006.  
 
Table 3 .1  Treatm ent  and cont rol group sam ple sizes and 
definit ions by year 
Year Sample definit ion Treatment   (Quebec)  N 
Cont rol 
(Ontario)  N 
2003 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-5 408 645 
2004 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-5 385 581 
2005 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-5 409 604 
2007 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-1 182 214 
2008 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-2 279 327 
2009 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-3 339 399 
2010 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-4 365 432 
2011 Mothers whose youngest  child is 0-5 395 486 
  Total  2,762 3,688 
 
We define our cont rol group using the same cr iter ia used to ident ify the 
t reatment  group. This group is comprised of partnered Ontar io mothers of 
children under the age of six dur ing the pre-period and mothers of children 
born after January 1, 2006 in the post  per iod. Table 3.1 shows the sample 
sizes and definit ion of our t reatment  and cont rol groups over our per iod of 
analysis. Our t reatment  group is com prised of 2,762 mothers and our 
cont rol group 3,688.   
 
3 .3 . Econom etr ic Specificat ions 
 
To test  our hypothesis, we est imate a standard difference- in-difference 
specificat ion:  
 
Outcomei =  β0 + β1TREATi +  β2POSTt + β3(TREAT × POST)𝑡𝑡 +  δi + λ𝑡𝑡 +  εi   
 
The subscr ipt  𝑖𝑖 indicates the indiv idual and 𝑡𝑡 indicates the year. TREATi is a 
dummy var iable equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is a member of the t reatment  
group, as defined in the previous sect ion;  𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑻𝑻𝒕𝒕 is a dum my equal to ‘1’ if 
the observat ion is in the post -per iod;  𝜹𝜹𝒊𝒊  is a vector of cont rols;  and 𝝀𝝀𝒕𝒕 
denotes year fixed effects. 𝜷𝜷𝟑𝟑  is our parameter of interest  and is an 
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I ntent ion to Treat  ( I TT)  est imate of the impact  of QPI P on our labor market  
outcomes for the populat ion of eligible partnered Quebec mothers.  
 
We use three specificat ions to est imate the effect  of QPIP on each labor 
market  outcome of interest . Model 1 follows the standard difference- in-
difference specificat ion above, combining years 2007-2011 in a single post  
per iod with no cont rol var iables. Model 2 cont rols for factors closely 
associated with labor market  outcomes including age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years of work experience, which 
have been shown to signif icant ly influence mothers’ labor m arket  outcomes 
(e.g. Waldfogel, 1998) . I t  also includes full year dumm ies to account  for  
general per iod effects. Finally, because we are interested in the t im ing of 
effects post - reform , Model 3 repeats Model 2, replacing the basic 
(TREAT × POST)𝑡𝑡  interact ion with a ser ies of interact ions for each post -
reform  year, allowing us to ident ify the year in which reform  effects 
manifest :  
 
Outcomei =  β0 +  β1TREATi +  β2(TREATi × 2007)
+ β3(TREATi × 2008) + β4(TREATi × 2009) + β5(TREATi × 2010)
+ β6(TREATi × 2011) + δ𝑖𝑖 + λ𝑡𝑡 +  εi 
 
We define our five outcome var iables of interest  using several SLI D survey 
indicators. Labor force part icipat ion is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is in 
the labor force dur ing the reference year. Full- t ime employment  status, 
condit ional on being in the labor force, is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is 
employed full- t ime during the reference year, and ‘0’ if unemployed or 
employed part - t ime. Part - t ime employment  status is equal to ‘1’ if the 
respondent  is employed less than full- t ime during the given reference year. 
Unemployment  is equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is unemployed at  any point  
dur ing the reference year and ‘0’ if employed. Log hourly wage is based on 
a cont inuous measure of hourly wages for all respondents with earnings in 
the reference year and is expressed in 2002 Canadian Dollars ( rebased 
using Stat ist ics Canada’s annual consumer pr ice index) .  For analyses of 
binary outcome measures, our specif icat ions use linear probability  models. 
Detailed descr ipt ions of these measures are available in the Appendix.  
 
3 .4 . Com paring Labor Market  Outcom es in Treatm ent  and Control 
Groups  
 
Figure 3.1 displays t rends for Quebec and Ontar io mothers along our four 
outcome var iables of interest  from  2003-2011 (see Appendix Table 1 for 
full summary stat ist ics) . Pr ior to QPI P’s implementat ion in 2006, all 
outcome indicators develop roughly in parallel.  From 2007-2011 however, 
we observe a steep increase in labor force part icipat ion rate and full- t ime 
employment  for Quebec mothers, while these indicators remain relat ively 
stable for Ontar io mothers. We also observe a steep decline in part - t ime 
employment  and unemployment  among Quebec mothers. The figures on 
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the raw data show that  it  is hard to claim  that  the mothers in Ontar io are 
completely unaffected by the policy changes in Quebec as their  t rends also 
exhibit  some var iat ion, hence const itut ing a comparison group, rather than 
a t rue cont rol group in the experimental sense. However, our claim  in the 
rest  of the paper, after covariate adjustments, and a bat tery of robustness 
checks including an event -study (not  reported) , non-parametr ic matching 
( reported in sect ion 4.5)  and a placebo test  (also reported in sect ion 4.5) , 
is that  the policy reform  in Quebec changed the labor market  outcomes 
more dramat ically compared to Ontar io mothers. We discuss all possible 
threats to ident if icat ion in the next  sect ion and report  a ser ies robustness 
checks in sect ion 4.5. 
 
Figure 3 .1  Trends in Labor Market  Outcom es for  Treatm ent  and 
Control Groups 
 
Note:  vert ical grey bars indicate the t reatm ent  year, 2006.   
 
3 .5 . Possible Threats to I dent ificat ion 
 
We ident ify four  m ain threats to our ident if icat ion st rategy. Because our 
difference- in-difference model uses cross-sect ional data, it  relies on the 
assumpt ion that  there are no composit ional changes in our t reatment  or 
cont rol group over t ime.  However, is possible that  QPI P fundamentally 
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changed the composit ion of our t reatm ent  group in the post - reform  period, 
perhaps encouraging women to have more children, inducing different  
types of women to become mothers or influencing decisions about  
accumulat ing years of educat ion or work experience pr ior to having children 
in light  of the change in benefits. To assess QPI P’s effect  on the composit ion 
of our t reatment  group, we run difference- in-difference models to explore 
whether exposure to QPI P significant ly altered the composit ion of Quebec 
mothers along observable character ist ics available in SLI D:  number of 
children, years of educat ion, years of work experience, and age. I f,  in fact ,  
QPI P significant ly affected the composit ion of our t reatment  group, we 
would expect  to see a significant  result  in these models. However as shown 
in Table 3.2, we see no such effects. Although there are stat ist ically 
significant  differences between mothers in Quebec and Ontar io on age and 
years of educat ion, these do not  develop different ly over t ime following the 
int roduct ion of QPI P (see Appendix Table 2 for summary stat ist ics for these 
measures) . This provides some assurance that  QPI P did not  fundamentally 
alter the composit ion of Quebec mothers along character ist ics we are able 
to observe in SLI D, although our data does not  allow us to explore other 
possible com posit ional measures such as the spacing of children or 
women’s career t rajector ies.  
 
Table 3 .2  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers' Character ist ics 
  
Years of 
educat ion 
Years of work 
experience Age 
Num ber of 
children 
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post   -0.17 0.13  0.04 0.29   0.22 0.25  -0.04 0.04 
Treat  -0.50* *     0.1 -0.37 0.22 -1.36* *  0.19 -0.09* *  0.03 
Post    0.10 0.08 -0.36 0.19  -0.38*  0.17  -0.02 0.03 
Constant  14.78* *  0.06 8.44* *  0.14 33.11* *  0.12  2.00* *  0.02 
N  7,521   6,450   7,521   7,521   
Note:  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01.  
 
Second, it  may also be a concern that  parents may have st rategically t imed 
the bir th of a child in order to be eligible for QPI P. Details about  QPI P’s 
features and implementat ion date were not  officially announced unt il March 
2005, making such behavior unlikely. St ill,  our analysis om its data from  
2006, likely account ing for any mothers who may have st rategically 
delayed their  bir ths unt il QPI P’s im plem entat ion.  
 
Third, because our per iod of analysis encompasses the Great  Recession 
(which in Canada was comprised of four quarters of negat ive GDP growth 
in 2009) , it  is possible that  different ial effects of the recession between 
Quebec and Ontar io m ight  bias our results. I f Ontar io were 
disproport ionally affected by the recession, our est imated effects of QPI P 
may be upwardly biased in years following the recession, while if Quebec 
were more severely affected, we m ight  expect  our est imates to be 
downwards biased. To explore whether the two provinces experienced the 
recession different ly, we run several difference- in-difference models using 
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the natural logar ithm  of province- level GDP ( in 2007 Canadian dollars)  and 
province- level unemployment  rates from Stat ist ics Canada (2017;  2018) 
as outcome measures. We analyze each outcome using two models:  one 
pooling effects in post - t reatment  years (Model 1)  and the other breaking 
results down into yearly effects (Model 2) . As shown in Table 3.3, we do 
not  find a stat ist ically signif icant  effect  of the recession on Quebec’s GDP 
or unemployment  rate relat ive to Ontar io in any of our  specificat ions, 
providing reassurance for our ident if icat ion. We provide further 
reassurance that  the recession has not  biased our results in our robustness 
checks in sect ion 4.5.   
 
Finally, other policy changes implemented during this t ime m ight  influence 
mothers’ outcomes. I n addit ion to adding a daddy quota, QPI P also made 
changes to maternity leave provisions, lowering eligibility requirements and 
increasing wage replacement  generosity. That  said, the inclusion of an 
individual ent it lement  to paternity leave reserved for fathers, where none 
previously existed, is the most  dramat ic change provided by QPI P. I ndeed, 
analysis of the im pact  of the reform  on parents’ leave- taking behavior 
suggests that  the effect  of the policy on parents’ behavior was also most 
dramat ic among fathers. Patnaik ( forthcom ing)  found that  QPI P increased 
fathers’ take up rates by 250%  ( from 21%  to 74% ) and their  average 
durat ion of leave by 160%  ( from 2.0 to 3.2 weeks)  while it  only increased 
mothers’ take up rates by 16%  ( from 73%  to 85% ) and their  leave durat ion 
by 4%  ( from 42.5 to 44.4 weeks) . 
 
St ill,  because the changes in maternity leave and paternity leave were 
implemented simultaneously, we cannot  ent irely isolate the effect  of each 
change. Research suggests that  m aternity leave increases mothers’ 
employment  cont inuity (e.g. Budig et  al.,  2012) , raising the concern that  
our est imate of QPI P’s effect  on mothers’ labor force part icipat ion may be 
upwardly biased. However, maternity leave may also increase 
specializat ion within the household – part icular ly as it  increases in durat ion 
– by locat ing childcare responsibility  within the fam ily, and specifically 
among mothers. Evidence suggests that  longer maternity leaves encourage 
part - t ime rather than full- t ime employm ent , carry a wage penalty and may 
exacerbate biased employer percept ions of mothers’ job commitment  and 
competency (Budig et al., 2012; Buligescu, de Crombrugghe, Menteşoǧlu, 
& Mont izaan, 2009;  Morgan & Zippel, 2003;  Morgenroth & Heilman, 2017;  
Pet t it  & Hook, 2009) . Thus, QPI P’s extension of maternity leave may lead 
to an underest imat ion of the effect  a daddy quota on these outcomes 
through this analysis, if increased maternity leave operates in the reverse 
direct ion to the effects of a daddy quota. 
 
Researching further changes to Quebec and Canadian fam ily policy beyond 
QPI P, we find no other substant ial changes during the period of analysis. 
Quebec has a publicly subsidized childcare system, unlike the rest  of 
Canada, which may make it  easier for Quebecois women to part icipate in 
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paid employment  (Fort in, Godbout , & St -Cerny, 2012;  Moyser & Milan, 
2018) . However, this system  was first  implemented in 1997, nearly a 
decade pr ior to QPI P, and there were no changes to Quebec’s childcare 
policy dur ing our per iod of analysis, (2003-2011) . Therefore the existence 
of the previous policy is unlikely to bias our results.  
 
Table 3 .3  Recession im pact  on ( ln)  province GDP ( 2 0 0 7  Canadian 
dollars)  and unem ploym ent  rate 
  
( ln)  GDP Unem ploym ent  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.02 0.02 
  
-1.77 0.83 
  
Treat  -0.67* *  0.02 -0.67* *  0.02 1.83*  0.65 1.83*  0.73 
Post  0.05* *  0.02 0.05*  0.02 0.97 0.58 0.97 0.65 
Treat  x 2007   -0.00 0.03 
  
-2.27 1.22 
Treat  x 2008   0.02 0.03 
  
-2.37 1.22 
Treat  x 2009   0.01 0.03 
  
-0.97 1.22 
Treat  x 2010   0.03 0.03 
  
-1.57 1.22 
Treat  x 2011   0.05 0.03 
  
-1.67 1.22 
Constant  13.25* *  0.01 13.25* *  0.01 6.77* *  0.46 6.77* *  0.51 
N 16   16   16   16   
Note:  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. Analysis based on data from CANI SM table 384-0038 
and CANI SM table 282-0002. 
 
4 . Results 
4 .1 . Labor Force Part icipat ion 
 
Table 4.1 reports the linear probability model results from our difference-
in-difference specif icat ions est im at ing the impact  of QPI P on Quebec 
mothers’ labor force part icipat ion.  
 
I n Model 2, we est imate the policy increases Québécois mothers’ likelihood 
of being in the labor  force by 5 percentage points compared to the Ontar ian 
mothers in our cont rol group after the policy change over the five years. 
This 5 percentage point  increase equates to a 6 percent  increase from our 
expected labor force part icipat ion among Quebec mothers of 75% . I n Model 
3 however, we find that  the effect  of the reform  var ies over t ime. We 
observe no effect  in 2007, perhaps indicat ing lagged effects of the policy. 
We find mothers exposed to the policy are 8 percentage points more likely 
to part icipate in the labor force in 2008, relat ive to expectat ions in the 
absence of the policy, and 7 percentage points more likely in 2009. I n 2010 
and 2011, however we find stat ist ically non-significant  – although st ill 
posit ive – effects. 
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Table 4 .1 . I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers' Labor Force Part icipat ion, 
LPM Results N= 6 ,4 5 0  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.04 0.02 0.05*  0.02   
Treat  0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Post  0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.03   
Treat  x 2007     0.00 0.05 
Treat  x 2008     0.08*  0.04 
Treat  x 2009     0.07*  0.03 
Treat  x 2010     0.06 0.03 
Treat  x 2011     0.02 0.03 
Cont rols No Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.16 0.16 
F 5.81* * *  87.21* *  68.01* *  
Note:  Cont rols include full year dumm ies, age, age-squared and num ber of 
children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. 
 
4 .2 . Full- t im e versus Part - t im e Em ploym ent  
 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present  the results from our specificat ions 
est imat ing the im pact  of QPI P on the likelihood that  Quebec mothers report  
full- t ime and part  t ime employment . I n Model 2, we find a signif icant  effect  
across both outcom es:  mothers exposed to the policy are 5 percentage 
points more likely to work full- t ime and 5 percentage points less likely to 
work part  t ime in the post - reform  period relat ive to Ontar io mothers. These 
results const itute an 8%  increase in full- t ime employment  over the 
expected full- t ime employment  rate in the absence of QPI P, 64.7% , and a 
16%  decrease from the expected part - t ime employment  rate, 33.0% . 
Breaking these results down by year in Model 3 we find vir tually no effect  
in 2007 on either outcome. We find a stat ist ically a signif icant  increase in 
full- t ime employm ent  of 14 percentage points relat ive to expected 
outcomes in the absence of the policy, and a decrease in part - t ime 
employment  of the same magnitude in 2008 and 2009 but  in 2010 and 
2011, we find negligible, non-significant  effects across outcomes. Possible 
explanat ions for the dissipat ion of effects in 2010 and 2011 are considered 
in the discussion sect ion.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest  that  the increase in mothers’ labor 
force part icipat ion largely manifests as full- t ime employm ent  rather than 
as part - t ime employment . This dist inct ion is important  as part - t ime 
employment  often t ranslates to lower pay and fewer opportunit ies for 
career advancement  (Manning & Pet rongolo, 2008) . 
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Table 4 .2  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Full- Tim e Em ploym ent , LPM 
Results N= 5 ,3 0 8  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.04 0.03 0.05*  0.03   
Treat  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Post  0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03   
Treat  x 2007     -0.01 0.05 
Treat  x 2008     0.14* *  0.04 
Treat  x 2009     0.14* *  0.04 
Treat  x 2010     0.02 0.04 
Treat  x 2011     -0.01 0.04 
Cont rols No Yes Yes 
R2             0.01                 0.13                  0.13 
F 9.38* * *  57.34* *  46.06* *  
Note:  Cont rols include full year dumm ies, age, age-squared and num ber of 
children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. 
 
Table 4 .3 . I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers' Part - Tim e Em ploym ent , 
LPM Results N= 5 ,1 3 0  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  
-0.04 0.03 -0.05*  0.03   
Treat  
-0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Post  
-0.03 0.02 -0.05 0.03   
Treat  x 2007     0.01 0.05 
Treat  x 2008     -0.14* *  0.05 
Treat  x 2009     -0.14* *  0.04 
Treat  x 2010     -0.02 0.04 
Treat  x 2011     0.01 0.04 
Cont rols No Yes Yes 
R2               0.00                 0.11                 0.11 
F 8.73* * *  44.52* *  36.01* *  
Note:  Cont rols include full year dumm ies, age, age-squared and num ber of 
children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. 
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4 .3 . Unem ploym ent  
 
Shown in Table 4.4, we find that  QPI P decreased the likelihood that  Quebec 
mothers are unemployed by 4 percentage points relat ive to our 
expectat ions in the absence of the policy according to our Model 2 
specificat ion. This is a substant ial effect ,  const itut ing around 10%  decrease 
from the expected unemployment  rate among mothers on average per year 
in the absence of the policy, 9.3% . I n Model 3, we find no effect  on 
unemployment  in 2007 and a reduct ion in the likelihood of being 
unemployed by 7 percentage points in 2008 and 6 percentage points in 
2009. I n 2010 and 2011 we cont inue to find negat ive effects, although 
these are not  stat ist ically significant .  
 
Table 4 .4 . I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers' Unem ploym ent , LPM 
Results N= 4 ,6 5 5  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  
-0.04*  0.02 -0.04* *  0.02   
Treat  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Post  
-0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.02   
Treat  x 2007     0.00 0.03 
Treat  x 2008     -0.07*  0.03 
Treat  x 2009     -0.06*  0.02 
Treat  x 2010     -0.05 0.03 
Treat  x 2011     -0.04 0.02 
Cont rols No Yes Yes 
R2 0.00 0.03 0.03 
F 4.39* *  6.55* *  5.24* *  
Note:  Cont rols include full year dumm ies, age, age-squared and num ber of 
children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. 
 
4 .4 . Log Hourly W ages 
 
Finally, we explore QPI P’s impact  on m others’ hourly wages. Our ex ante 
expectat ion is that  by encouraging a more gender equal div ision of 
household labor, QPI P would allow mothers to devote more t ime and effort  
to paid labor, which, over t ime should increase their  financial 
compensat ion. However, as shown in Table 4.5, our results do not  support  
this hypothesis. We find posit ive but  stat ist ically non-signif icant  effects on 
hourly wages across our models. 
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Table 4 .5 . I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers' Hourly W ages, OLS Results 
N= 4 ,6 6 5  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.02 0.03 0.04 0.02   
Treat  
-0.13* *  0.02 -0.06* *  0.02 -0.06* *  0.02 
Post  0.10* *  0.02 0.08*  0.03   
Treat  x 2007     0.03 0.05 
Treat  x 2008     0.02 0.04 
Treat  x 2009     0.03 0.04 
Treat  x 2010     0.06 0.04 
Treat  x 2011     0.06 0.03 
Cont rols No Yes Yes 
R2 0.03 0.34 0.34 
F 41.74* * *  170.01* * *  132.79* * *  
Note:  Cont rols include full year dumm ies, age, age-squared and num ber of 
children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. * *  p< 0.01. 
 
4 .5 . Robustness Checks and alternat ive specificat ions 
 
We run a ser ies of robustness checks using our Model 2 specificat ion. First , 
we run a sem i-parametr ic difference- in-difference model for each outcome 
var iable. Rather than using Ontar io m others as a cont rol group, we use 
kernel propensity score matching to const ruct  a group of mothers with 
children age 5 and under from across Canada who are comparable to 
Quebec mothers in age, years of educat ion and number of children.  
 
The results from these specificat ions, shown in Table 4.6, st rongly support  
our main results. We find that  exposure to QPI P increases likelihood of labor 
force part icipat ion by 6 percentage points in the post  per iod relat ive to 
expected outcomes based on t ime tends of comparable mothers in our 
const ructed cont rol group. We find the policy also increases Quebec 
mothers’ likelihood of working full- t ime by 4 percentage points and 
decreases the likelihood of working part - t ime by 4 percentage points and 
unemployment  by 2 percentage points. Again, we find no signif icant  effect  
on wages.  
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Table 4 .6  Robustness Check 1 : Sem i- Param etr ic Difference- in-
Difference Models 
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
Unem ploy-
m ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages 
  
B SE B B B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Est im ator 0.06* *  0.02 0.04*  0.02 -0.04*  0.02 -0.02*  0.01 -0.01 0.02 
R2 0.16 
 
0.12 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.32 
 
N 13,260 10,635 10,307 9,197 9,240 
Note:  Models include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared and 
number of children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. 
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
Next , we run Model 2 using 2004 as a placebo t reatment  year. Our pre-
period is therefore defined as 2002-2003 and our post -per iod is defined as 
2005-2011. I f QPI P’s im plementat ion in 2006 is t ruly dr iv ing the effects we 
detect  in our main specificat ions, we should not  f ind significant  effects 
under this placebo specificat ion. I ndeed, as shown in Table 4.7, none of our 
Treat  x Post  2004 interact ions is stat ist ically signif icant .  
 
Table 4 .7  Robustness Check 2 : Placebo Treatm ent  Year ( 2 0 0 4 )  
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
Unem ploy-
m ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages 
  B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Est im ator 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.02 
R2 0.17 
 
0.12 
 
0.10 
 
0.02 
 
0.33 
 
N 7,459   6,072   5,877   5,345   5,365   
Note:  Models include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared and 
number of children years of educat ion and years of work experience;  *  p< 0.05. 
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
Third, we explore the effect  of QPI P’s implementat ion on two alternat ive 
t reatment  groups:  mothers of older children in Quebec and fathers of young 
children in Quebec. I f QPI P has impacted young mothers in the way our 
results suggest , we should find no effect  on mothers with older children, 
who were ineligible for the policy. Among fathers, we should find no 
improvements in labor market  outcomes if the policy operates according to 
our expectat ions. We may, however, find a decline in fathers’ labor market  
outcomes if QPI P is successful in reducing gendered specializat ion within 
the household.  
 
Mothers of older children are defined as those whose youngest  child is 
between 6-17 years of age. We define fathers of young children in the same 
way we defined mothers of young children in our main models:  those whose 
youngest  child is under the age of 6 in the pre-period, and those whose 
youngest  child was born after the implementat ion of QPI P on January 1, 
2006 in the post -per iod. 
 
19 
We run our Model 2 specificat ions on both of these alternat ive t reatment  
groups. As shown in Table 4.8, among mothers of older children we do find 
a stat ist ically significant  effect  older m others’ labor force part icipat ion of 
comparable magnitude to that  found among mothers of young children, 
although we find no stat ist ically signif icant  impact  on older mothers’ full-
t ime or part - t ime employment , unemployment  or hourly wages or any labor 
market  outcomes for fathers of young children. The significant  effect  on 
labor force part icipat ion among older m others raises some concern that  the 
effect  ident if ied in our main specificat ion may be picking up on a general 
t rend for all mothers, rather than the effect  of QPI P itself. I f this were the 
case however, we m ight  also expect  to f ind comparable results to our main 
specificat ions on older mothers’ full- t ime employment , part - t ime 
employment  and unemployment . That  we find no signif icant  effects on 
these outcomes for older mothers provides some re-assurance as to the 
validity of our results.   
 
Table 4 .8  Robustness Check 3 : Alternat ive t reatm ent  groups 
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
Unem ploy-
m ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages 
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Mothers of older children  
Est im ator 0.06* *  0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 
R2 0.13  0.14  0.12  0.02  0.29 R2 
N 11,131   9,680   9,420   8,927   8,344 N 
Fathers of young children 
Est im ator  -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
R2 0.17 
 
0.15 
 
0.14 
 
0.03 
 
0.35 
 
N 6,352   5,680   5,542   5,185   4,971   
Note:  Models include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared and 
number of children, years of educat ion and years of work exper ience;  *  p< 0.05. 
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
I n a final robustness check, we return to the concern that  different ial effects 
of Great  Recession on Quebec and Ontar io may be dr iv ing our results for 
labor force part icipat ion, full- t ime and part - t ime employment  and 
unemployment . I f,  indeed our results were a spur ious art ifact  of the 
recession, we would expect  to find sim ilar results for other groups, with 
effects concent rated in 2008 and 2009. To analyze whether this is the case 
we run our Model 3 specificat ion using fathers of young children as our 
t reatment  group. As shown in Table 4.9, we find no such effects. We do 
find that  fathers exposed to the policy were nine percentage points less 
likely to work full- t ime in 2007, perhaps indicat ing that  the policy may have 
been successful in reducing gendered household specializat ion among 
fathers. However this effect  dissipates and becomes stat ist ically non-
significant  in subsequent  years.  
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Table 4 .9  Robustness Check 4 : Test  for  recession effect  on fathers 
of young children 
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
Unem ploy-
m ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.07* *  0.02 
Treat  x 
2007 0.01 0.03 -0.09*  0.04 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 
Treat  x 
2008 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
Treat  x 
2009 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Treat  x 
2010 -0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 
Treat  x 
2011 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.06 0.03 
R2 0.17 
 
0.15 
 
0.13 
 
0.03 
 
0.35 
 
N 6,352   5,680   5,542   5,185   4,971   
Note:  Models include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared and 
number of children, years of educat ion and years of work exper ience;  *  p< 0.05. 
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
I n addit ion to these robustness checks, we run several alternat ive 
specificat ions to test  the sensit ivity of our results ( results are presented in 
Appendix Tables 3-6) . Our main t reatment  and cont rol groups are 
comprised of a diverse group of mothers with young children ranging in age 
from 0-5 years old. Because parental responsibilit ies and factors like 
childcare use and availability differ by age of child, QPI P’s effect  on 
mothers’ labor market  outcomes may differ as children grow older. Our 
data does not  allow us to assess the impact  of the policy longitudinally, 
however we use Model 2 to explore the effects of the policy among several 
subsamples of our t reatment  and cont rol groups. First , we drop mothers of 
5-year olds from the model as kindergarten is universally available 
(although not  mandatory)  in Quebec from age 5. The results, presented in 
Appendix Table 3, vary lit t le from  our main Model 2 findings although the 
coefficient  on hourly wages is slight ly larger at  0.06 and stat ist ically 
significant  where it  was 0.04 and non-signif icant  in our main specif icat ions.  
 
Next , we run model two for a sam ple of mothers of 1-2 year olds throughout  
the per iod of analysis and then for mothers of 3-4 year olds. As shown in 
Appendix Table 4 -  5, our results are qualitat ively sim ilar to our main 
findings. For mothers of 1-2 year olds, the magnitudes of effects are 
broadly sim ilar but  standard errors are larger in several instances, 
reflect ing the substant ially reduced sample size. For mothers of 3-4 year 
olds, the magnitudes of effects are smaller than our main results and non-
significant  however it  is im portant  to note that  the post  per iod in this 
specificat ion can only be drawn from 2010 and 2011 and therefore post  
year sample sizes are small. That  said, the direct ion of effects for this group 
are in line with our expectat ions and m ain results.  
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Finally, we run our Model 2 specificat ions on a sample of t reated and cont rol 
group mothers of children age 0-5 years old in each year of analysis as 
opposed to our main specif icat ions in which the sample definit ion changes 
by age of youngest  child in each post  year. Results are largely consistent  
with our  main findings although the magnitude of coefficients is smaller for 
some outcomes than in our main specificat ions. This is unsurpr ising, 
however, consider ing that  in post  years our t reatment  group is “diluted”  
with Quebec mothers who’s children were born pr ior to 2006 and were 
therefore not  eligible for the policy.  
 
5 . Discussion &  Conclusion 
The results of our analysis suggest  that  the int roduct ion of QPI P has 
improved some of mothers’ labor market  outcomes in the province, with 
Quebec mothers exposed to the policy more likely to part icipate in the labor  
force than they would have been in the absence of the policy. Further  
invest igat ion shows that  much of this increased labor force part icipat ion 
manifests as full- t im e work and that  mothers exposed to the policy are less 
likely work part - t im e and less likely to be unemployed. Finally, although 
these findings are in line with our hypothesis that  a daddy quota such as 
QPI P may reduce mothers’ specializat ion at  the household level, allowing 
them to dedicate more t ime and effort  to paid work, we do not  find evidence 
that  the policy had a stat ist ically significant  effect  on mothers’ hourly 
wages. These results are robust  to a var iety of bat tery of placebo and 
sensit ivit y tests including an alternat ive non-param etr ic matching 
technique a year placebo test , and a var iety of robustness checks using 
placebo t reatment  groups.  
 
The null result  on m others’ hourly wages could be interpreted in a number 
of ways. First , it  is possible that  QPI P simply had no discernable impact  on 
mothers’ wages. I t  is also possible that  it  may take several years to observe 
substant ial increases in earnings associated with increased part icipat ion in 
the labor force, and that  our per iod of analysis is too short  to capture such 
effects. Alternat ively, the result  could indicate that  although QPI P’s 
increases mothers’ labor market  act ivit ies, it  does not  dim inish the 
competency bias they face in the work place (e.g. Correll, Benard, & Paik, 
2007)  and therefore does not  result  in higher wages. The repeated cross-
sect ional nature of our data substant ially lim its our ability to explore these 
possibilit ies further. Future research would benefit  from  longitudinal 
analysis of wage t rajector ies, which could bet ter reflect  how mothers’ 
wages develop longitudinally as a result  of QPI P.  
 
Our results broken down by year find that  QPI P’s effects are concent rated 
in 2008 and 2009, decreasing in size and significance in 2010 and 2011. 
That  the dissipat ion of QPI P’s effects took place in the imm ediate wake of 
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the Canada’s Great  Recession in 2009 raises quest ions over the efficacy of 
such policies in t im es of econom ic uncertainty. Alternat ively, the decrease 
in size and stat ist ical significance of QPI P’s effects on mothers’ labor market  
outcomes could indicate that  the effects of the policy are exclusively short -
term  and have no last ing impact  on mothers’ career outcomes in the 
medium  run. I n an effort  to explore this possibility , we conducted an 
exploratory t r iple difference model analysing QPI P’s effects on Quebec 
mothers, broken down by age of child however small cell counts and a lack 
of precision made it  difficult  to draw a clear conclusion about  how the 
policies effects differ across the age of the child.  
 
As suggested above, future research could shed light  on this quest ion by 
analysing mothers’ outcomes longitudinally and over a longer per iod of 
t ime, which was not  possible in this analysis due to sample size const raints 
of SLI D’s panel com ponent  and the survey’s discont inuat ion in 2011. Such 
analysis would provide valuable insight  into when and how QPI P’s impact 
on mothers’ labor market  outcomes manifest  and how they develop in the 
longer term  as children grow older.  
 
This research cont r ibutes to the broader literature on work- fam ily 
reconciliat ion policies by assessing the effects of the implementat ion of a 
daddy quota in a non-Nordic set t ing and adds to a growing body of 
empir ical evaluat ions of such policy inst ruments. Given the motherhood 
penalty’s role in dr iving persist ing gender equalit ies such as the gender 
wage gap and the increasing prom inence of daddy quotas in policy debates 
across indust r ialized count r ies, gaining a bet ter understanding of the effect  
of daddy quotas as a potent ial policy tool for addressing econom ic gender 
inequalit ies in a var iety of contexts is cr it ical.  
 
Our results should be considered alongside the findings of previous 
research. Our est imates show that  QPI P increases mothers’ labor force 
part icipat ion and full- t ime employment  and decreases their  part - t ime 
employment  and unemployment , in line with Patnaik’s ( forthcom ing)  
findings that  the policy increased mothers’ t ime spent  in paid work. 
However, these findings are at  odds with the null and negat ive effects on 
mothers’ labor supply in Norway ident ified by Ekberg et  al. (2013)  and by 
Cools et  al. (2015) , respect ively. On the other hand, our  non-significant  
results regarding QPI P’s affect  on mothers’ wages appears to cont rast  both 
Johansson's (2010)  and Andersen’s (2018)  posit ive est imates and Cools et  
al. ’s (2015)  negat ive one. 
 
The results from  this analysis provide important  evidence that  daddy 
quotas may be useful policy tools for addressing gender inequalit ies in the 
labor market , however, as discussed above, further research in this area is 
warranted. As m ore than a decade has now passed since the 
implementat ion of the policy, future studies would do well to invest igate 
longer- term  effects of the reform . Future invest igat ions would also benefit  
23 
from consider ing addit ional labor market  outcomes unavailable in SLI D like 
job promot ions or female ent repreneurship. Finally, further research on 
QPI P and daddy quotas in other contexts is required to gain an 
understanding of how such policies operate under varying macroeconomic 
condit ions, part icular ly dur ing and outside recessions and other such global 
shocks.  
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Appendix 
Labor Market  Outcom e Variables of I nterest  
 
We define our outcome var iables of interest  using several SLI D survey 
indicators:  
1. Labor force part icipat ion, equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is in the labor 
force dur ing the reference year and ‘0’ otherwise. 
2. Full- t ime employment  status, condit ional on being in the labor force, 
equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is employed full- t ime during the given 
reference year, and ‘0’ if unem ployed or employed part - t ime. 
Respondents who are out  of the labor force dur ing the reference year 
are coded as m issing.  
3. Part - t ime employm ent  status, equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is 
employed less than full- t ime during the given reference year. This 
includes individuals who were employed part  of the year as well as 
those employed par t - t ime all year round. This indicator is equal to ‘0’ 
where the individual is employed full- t ime during the reference year. 
Respondents who are out  of the labor force dur ing the reference year 
are coded as m issing. 
4. Unemployment , equal to ‘1’ if the respondent  is unemployed at  any 
point  dur ing the reference year and ‘0’ if the respondent  is employed 
the ent irety of the reference year. Respondents who are out  of the 
labor force dur ing the reference year are coded as m issing. 
5. Log hourly wage, based on a cont inuous var iable report ing hourly 
wages for all respondents with earnings dur ing the reference year, 
expressed in constant  2002 Canadian Dollars ( rebased using 
Stat ist ics Canada’s annual consumer pr ice index) . This indicator uses 
SLI D’s measure of pre- tax, pre- t ransfer earnings, recorded direct ly 
for respondents who report  their  earnings as an hourly amount , or 
converted to an hourly rate for individuals who report  other wage 
formats using other informat ion provided. 
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Appendix Table 1  Labor Market  Outcom es over t im e for  Treatm ent  
and Control Groups 
    
Quebec 
Mothers 
Ontar io 
Mothers Difference 
    M SD M SD 
 
2003 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  74.02 0.44 70.85 0.45 3.17 
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  59.20 0.49 56.35 0.50 2.85 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  39.05 0.49 41.75 0.49 -2.70 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  16.86 8.08 18.98 9.86 -2.12* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  10.26 0.30 7.66 0.27 2.61 
N 408 
 
645 
  
2004 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  70.13 0.46 70.40 0.46 -0.27 
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  58.59 0.49 55.99 0.50 2.60 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  38.78 0.49 41.34 0.49 -2.56 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  16.94 8.16 20.05 10.92 -3.12* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  10.37 0.31 11.00 0.31 -0.63 
N 385   581 
  
2005 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  71.15 0.45 70.20 0.46 0.95 
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  64.85 0.48 63.17 0.48 1.68 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  33.95 0.47 34.59 0.48 -0.64 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  16.65 7.86 19.68 9.91 -3.03* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  8.59 0.28 6.84 0.25 1.75 
N 409   604     
2007 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  70.33 0.46 70.09 0.46 0.24 
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  63.06 0.48 63.69 0.48 -0.63 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  34.87 0.48 34.10 0.48 0.76 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  18.52 10.38 20.92 10.53 -2.4*  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  7.81 0.27 5.33 0.23 2.48 
N 182   214     
2008 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  74.91 0.43 67.58 0.47 7.33*  
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  71.17 0.45 55.86 0.50 15.31* *  
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  27.19 0.45 41.87 0.49 -14.68* *  
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  18.22 8.51 21.17 11.57 -2.94* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  5.74 0.23 10.41 0.31 -4.67 
N 279   327     
2009 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  75.81 0.43 68.67 0.46 7.14*  
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  70.63 0.46 57.10 0.50 13.53* *  
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  27.60 0.45 41.04 0.49 -13.44* *  
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  18.31 8.20 21.73 11.45 -3.42* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  4.28 0.20 7.66 0.27 -3.38 
N 339   399     
29 
    
Quebec 
Mothers 
Ontar io 
Mothers Difference 
    M SD M SD 
 
2010 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  79.18 0.41 72.45 0.45 6.72*  
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  64.72 0.48 61.82 0.49 2.90 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  33.65 0.47 35.61 0.48 -1.96 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  19.43 9.83 21.99 11.71 -2.57* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  7.96 0.27 10.54 0.31 -2.58 
N 365   432     
2011 
Labor Force Part icipat ion (% )  76.96 0.42 73.46 0.44 3.51 
Full-Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  67.73 0.47 66.33 0.47 1.40 
Part -Tim e Em ploym ent  (% )  29.82 0.46 30.87 0.46 -1.05 
Mean Hourly Wages ($)  19.33 8.59 21.35 9.47 -2.02* *  
Unem ploym ent  (% )  4.28 0.20 6.44 0.25 -2.17 
N 395   486     
Notes:  Hourly wages are shown in 2002 Canadian dollars;  Asterisks indicate where 
group differences are stat ist ically significant  using a two- tailed t - test ;  *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01   
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Appendix Table 2  Com posit ion Treatm ent  and Control Groups over 
t im e 
    
Quebec 
Mothers 
Ontar io 
Mothers Difference 
  
M SD M SD   
2003 
Years of educat ion 14.31 3.17 14.73 2.81 -0.42*  
Years of work 
experience 8.00 5.90 8.41 6.10 -0.41 
Average Age 31.56 5.53 33.00 5.62 -1.44* *  
Num ber of children 1.93 0.91 2.01 0.93 -0.07 
2004 
Years of educat ion 14.47 3.22 14.95 2.88 -0.48*  
Years of work 
experience 7.90 5.90 8.56 5.89 -0.66 
Average Age 31.60 5.48 33.19 5.53 -1.59* *  
Num ber of children 1.93 0.91 1.98 0.89 -0.05 
2005 
Years of educat ion 14.14 2.71 14.62 2.67 -0.48* *  
Years of work 
experience 8.29 5.60 8.34 6.13 -0.05 
Average Age 32.09 5.51 33.46 5.45 -1.37* *  
Num ber of children 1.89 0.88 2.01 0.90 -0.12*  
2007 
Years of educat ion 14.59 2.60 15.02 2.86 -0.43 
Years of work 
experience 6.87 4.74 7.78 5.27 -0.91 
Average Age 29.85 4.63 31.88 5.01 -2.03* *  
Num ber of children 1.74 0.87 1.91 0.90 -0.17 
2008 
Years of educat ion 14.08 2.54 14.73 2.63 -0.65* *  
Years of work 
experience 6.89 4.89 7.57 5.33 -0.68 
Average Age 30.75 4.99 31.88 5.18 -1.13* *  
Num ber of children 1.79 0.82 1.91 0.87 -0.12 
2009 
Years of educat ion 14.25 2.58 14.93 2.58 -0.68* *  
Years of work 
experience 7.22 5.00 7.87 5.49 -0.65 
Average Age 31.39 5.33 32.48 5.27 -1.09* *  
Num ber of children 1.82 0.04 1.98 0.93 -0.16*  
2010 
Years of educat ion 14.26 2.64 14.82 2.64 -0.56* *  
Years of work 
experience 8.18 5.21 8.42 5.68 -0.24 
Average Age 32.05 5.44 33.10 5.36 -1.05* *  
Num ber of children 1.85 0.84 1.97 0.87 -0.11 
2011 
Years of educat ion 14.27 2.72 15.19 2.63 -0.92* *  
Years of work 
experience 8.81 5.47 8.41 5.68 0.4 
Average Age 32.76 5.28 33.67 5.29 -0.92*  
Num ber of children 1.95 0.88 2.01 0.92 -0.06 
Notes:  Hourly wages are shown in 2002 Canadian dollars;  Asterisks indicate where 
group differences are stat ist ically significant  using a two- tailed t - test ;  *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01  
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Appendix Table 3  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Labor Market  
Outcom es, Model2 , m others of 0 - 4  year  olds  
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages 
Unem ploym en
t  
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x 
Post  0.06*  0.02 0.06*  0.03 
-
0.06*  0.03 0.06*  0.02 
-
0.05* *  0.02 
Treat  0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
-
0.07* *  0.02 0.01 0.01 
Post  0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.06*  0.03 -0.00 0.02 
N 5951   4910   4746   4330   4297   
Note:  Models 2 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
Appendix Table 4  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Labor Market  
Outcom es, Model2 , m others of 1 - 2  year  olds  
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages Unem ploym ent  
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x 
Post  0.06*  0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.07*  0.03 
-
0.08* *  0.03 
Treat  0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02 -0.04 0.03 
-
0.08* *  0.02 0.02 0.02 
Post  -0.03 0.03 -0.00 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07*  0.03 
N 3330   2703   2614   2391   2348   
Note:  Models 2 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
Appendix Table 5  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Labor Market  
Outcom es, Model2 , m others of 3 - 4  year  olds  
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages Unem ploym ent  
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x 
Post  0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.03 
Treat  0.02 0.02 0.05*  0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.06* *  0.02 -0.00 0.02 
Post  -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03 
N 2372   1991   1922   1703   1792   
Note:  Models 2 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01. 
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Appendix Table 6  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Labor Market  
Outcom es, Model2 , m others of 0 - 5  year  olds ( consistent  sam ple 
definit ion in each year)   
  
Labor force 
part icipat ion 
Full- t im e 
em ploym ent  
Part - t im e 
em ploym ent  
( ln)  Hourly 
wages Unem ploym ent  
 
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x 
Post  0.04*  0.02 0.05*  0.02 
-
0.05*  0.02 0.05*  0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Treat  0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.06* *  0.02 0.01 0.01 
Post  0.02 0.02 
-
0.05*  0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07* *  0.02 
-
0.04*  0.02 
N 7694   6343   6122   5534     5588 
Note:  Models 2 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;  *  p< 0.05  
* *  p< 0.01. 
 
Appendix Table 7  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Labor Force 
Part icipat ion, var iat ions on Models 2  and 3  
    
Model 2 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 3 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.05*  0.02 
  
0.03 0.02 
  
Treat  0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Post  -0.04 0.03 
  
-0.01 0.03 
  
Treat  x 2007 
  
-0.00 0.05 
  
-0.01 0.05 
Treat  x 2008 
  
0.08*  0.04 
  
0.05 0.04 
Treat  x 2009 
  
0.08*  0.03 
  
0.05 0.04 
Treat  x 2010 
  
0.06 0.03 
  
0.05 0.03 
Treat  x 2011 
  
0.02 0.03 
  
0.02 0.03 
R2 0.15 
 
0.15 
 
0.06 
 
0.06 
 
N 6,450   6,450   6,450   6,450   
Note:  Models 2 and 3 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for  age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  * *  
p< 0.01. 
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Appendix Table 8  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Full- t im e 
em ploym ent , var iat ions on Models 2  and 3  
   
Model 2 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 3 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.06*  0.03 
  
0.04 0.03 
  
Treat  0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 
Post  0.06 0.03 
  
0.04 0.03 
  
Treat  x 2007  
  
-0.01 0.05 
  
-0.02 0.06 
Treat  x 2008  
  
0.15* *  0.05 
  
0.13* *  0.05 
Treat  x 2009  
  
0.14* *  0.04 
  
0.11* *  0.04 
Treat  x 2010  
  
0.02 0.04 
  
0.00 0.04 
Treat  x 2011  
  
-0.01 0.04 
  
-0.02 0.04 
R2 0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
N 5,308   5,308   5,308   5,308   
Note:  Models 2 and 3 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for  age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  * *  
p< 0.01. 
 
Appendix Table 9  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Part - t im e 
em ploym ent , var iat ions on Models 2  and 3  
   
Model 2 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 3 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  -0.06*  0.03 
  
-0.04 0.03 
  
Treat  -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.02 
Post  -0.05 0.03 
  
-0.04 0.03 
  
Treat  x 2007  
  
0.01 0.05 
  
0.02 0.06 
Treat  x 2008  
  
-
0.15* *  0.05 
  
-
0.12* *  0.05 
Treat  x 2009  
  
-
0.14* *  0.04 
  
-
0.12* *  0.04 
Treat  x 2010  
  
-0.02 0.04 
  
0.00 0.04 
Treat  x 2011  
  
0.01 0.04 
  
0.01 0.04 
R2 0.10 
 
0.11 
 
0.04 
 
0.04 
 
N 5,130   5,130   5,130   5,130   
Note:  Models 2 and 3 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for  age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  * *  
p< 0.01. 
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Appendix Table 1 0  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ Unem ploym ent , 
var iat ions on Models 2  and 3  
    
Model 2 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 3 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  
-
0.04* *  0.02 
  
-0.04*  0.02 
  
Treat  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Post  -0.03 0.02 
  
-0.03 0.02 
  
Treat  x 2007  
  
0.00 0.03 
  
0.01 0.03 
Treat  x 2008  
  
-0.07*  0.03 
  
-0.06*  0.03 
Treat  x 2009  
  
-0.06*  0.02 
  
-0.05*  0.02 
Treat  x 2010  
  
-0.05 0.03 
  
-0.04 0.03 
Treat  x 2011  
  
-0.04 0.02 
  
-0.03 0.02 
R2 0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
N 4,655   4,655   4,655   4,655   
Note:  Models 2 and 3 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for  age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;   *  p< 0.05  * *  
p< 0.01. 
 
Appendix Table 1 1  I m pact  of QPI P on Mothers’ ( ln)  Hourly w ages, 
var iat ions on Models 2  and 3  
    
Model 2 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 3 without  
num ber of 
children 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
Model 2 without  
educat ion or 
work experience 
  
B SE B B SE B B SE B B SE B 
Treat  x Post  0.04*  0.02 
  
0.02 0.03 
  
Treat  
-
0.06* *  0.02 
-
0.06* *  0.02 
-
0.08* *  0.02 
-
0.08* *  0.02 
Post  0.07*  0.03 
  
0.10* *  0.03 
  
Treat  x 
2007 
  
0.03 0.05 
  
0.05 0.05 
Treat  x 
2008 
  
0.02 0.04 
  
-0.00 0.04 
Treat  x 
2009 
  
0.03 0.04 
  
0.00 0.04 
Treat  x 
2010 
  
0.06 0.04 
  
0.03 0.04 
Treat  x 
2011 
  
0.06 0.03 
  
0.02 0.04 
R2 0.34 
 
0.34 
 
0.19 
 
0.19 
 
N 4,665   4,665   4,665   4,665   
Note:  Models 2 and 3 include full year dumm ies and cont rols for  age, age-squared, 
number of children, years of educat ion and years work exper ience;  *   p< 0.05  * *  
p< 0.01. 
 
